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Whether a foundation’s primary interest is community development, enhancing the 
arts, alleviating poverty or almost any other charitable purpose, it will almost 
inevitably be confronted with the need to respond to some form of disaster, because 
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Washington ranks 14th in the 
nation in the number of federal 
disaster declarations since 
1956, with a total of 43. Most 
have been for severe storms 
with a combination of flooding, 
landslides and/or mudslides. 
Washington has also had 20 
fire management assistance 
declarations. 
 
—Data from FEMA Web site, 







This study was commissioned by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, The Seattle Foundation 
and United Way of King County to identify potential roles for philanthropy in strengthening the 
resilience of Washington communities when confronted with disaster.  Although few Washington 
philanthropies have disaster preparedness and relief as an explicit focus of their giving, many 
are finding that requests for their involvement in this field are coming more often and with 
greater urgency. For philanthropies working with disadvantaged populations, this trend is 
especially acute, because those groups are at greater risk, suffer more severe effects, and take 
longer to recover from a disaster than others. 
 
Many philanthropists have responded generously to recent disasters with one-time grants.  
However there has been an understandable reluctance to become more deeply involved in this 
field because until recently disasters were regarded as rare occurrences that affected local 
communities.  The events of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina—accented by the 
December 2007 floods in Southwest Washington—marked a watershed in this perception.  Here 
in Washington, the increasing frequency and severity of flooding, windstorms and other 
disasters attest to the need for greater effort to prepare our communities to endure and recover 
from such events. 
 
This report explores the possibility that philanthropy could play critical roles in making 
Washington’s communities more resilient when confronted with disasters.  To identify 
philanthropy’s potential roles, a Task Force comprised of experts from across the state 
examined the various stages of disaster and the capabilities of the parties responsible for taking 





In general, preparedness and the initial response to a disaster are perceived to be the province 
of government agencies, while responsibility for recovery and mitigation is more diffuse, with 
community organizations and the private sector more directly involved. 
 
 
Strengths and Gaps in Washington’s Capabilities 
 
As the Task Force reviewed Washington’s current capabilities, several key findings emerged: 
 
1. The level of preparedness and the ability to respond have improved in our state during 
the past two decades as a result of hard work by state and local officials to respond to 
federal mandates and learn lessons from past crises.  Lines of responsibility have been 
clarified, communities are better equipped, and regular training exercises are conducted 
in most communities to expose and correct problems.  All 39 counties and 23 local and 
tribal jurisdictions have Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to coordinate the actions 
of public agencies in a crisis.  Schools and many public agencies have emergency plans 
in place.  However, serious gaps remain: 
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• Most families, individuals and businesses are not fully prepared for emergencies. 
 
• Rural areas often do not have the same level of emergency resources as urban 
communities. 
 
• Vulnerable populations remain at greater risk. 
 
• Language and cultural barriers continue to be a major challenge, and alternative 
communication methods are needed to reach individuals who are deaf or deaf/blind. 
 
• Funding for emergency services is precarious, especially in the current economic 
climate. 
 
2. During the recovery phase, the Task Force found that there is a profound difference 
between the public’s expectations and the reality of most victims’ experience.  In 
general, disaster victims expect their government to restore them to the conditions in 
which they were living before the disaster occurred, but that is rarely what happens.  The 
process to secure federal disaster relief is slow at best, leaving most victims without 
financial assistance for an average of eight to 10 weeks while public officials complete 
the steps necessary to survey the damage and complete the required paperwork.  
Nonprofit and faith-based organizations do their best to help victims through this period, 
but their resources are often not equal to the task.   
 
When government financial aid finally arrives, it is rarely sufficient to compensate the 
victims for the damage they have suffered: The average disaster relief grant from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is less than $5,000, and the statutory 
limit for such payments is just $30,300 per family, which is certainly not enough to 
rebuild a home destroyed during a disaster.  This mismatch between expectations and 
reality during recovery is painfully evident in the experience of the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina, many thousands of whom are still struggling to recover more than three years 
after the flood.  Here in Washington, neither the public sector, nor private nonprofit 





Ed Palmer, who has severe arthritis, has had to rely for 
the past 10 days on a generator to power his oxygen 
and electric wheelchair.  (December 25, 2006) 
 
Credit: Meryl Schenker/Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
2006 Storm/Seattle PI/December 29, 2006 
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3. Although mitigation is not always treated as an integral part of disaster planning, it is an 
area that holds great promise, for if the causes of a disaster can be identified and 
removed, future losses can be prevented.  Studies have shown that each dollar invested 
in proven mitigation techniques avoids $3 to $4 dollars in future costs.   
 
During the 1990s, the federal government had a formal policy of investing 10 percent of 
the total cost of a disaster in mitigation projects aimed at preventing a recurrence of that 
disaster.  Under this policy flooded homes were purchased and removed from flood 
plains, wetlands and other natural systems were restored, and buildings were stabilized 
against the effects of earthquakes.  While some federal funding continues to be 
dedicated to mitigation, the level of effort is dependent on annual appropriations, and the 
interest of the Administration and the Congress has waxed and waned during the past 
decade.  At the local level, mitigation strategies, such as Seattle’s Project Impact, have 
not captured the attention of the philanthropic sector, or secured ongoing public 
investment.  As a result, our communities have missed opportunities to analyze the 
causes of certain disasters and take actions to mitigate them. 
 
4. Vulnerable populations – the poor, the elderly, disabled individuals and those who do not 
speak English – continue to be at greatest risk during all phases of a disaster.  The poor 
tend to live in the least desirable areas, which are also most prone to floods and other 
disasters.  Populations with limited English or communities new to the United States do 
not always have access to timely information in a language they can understand or from 
sources they trust. 
 
Elderly and disabled individuals living alone are in special jeopardy unless they have a 
network of support in a time of crisis.  Some organizations have taken important steps to 
address the challenges.  For example, Public Health – Seattle & King County has 
recently implemented strategies to improve communications across language and 
cultural barriers, and foundations have provided funds to enable some key community 
agencies to develop their own emergency plans to keep vital services operating when 
disaster strikes.  However it is apparent that much more work is needed to meet the 





Toddler outside a home marked after the Katrina 
flooding in New Orleans. 
Source: www.TheWE.cc 
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“The ability of nonprofits and 
government agencies to 
collaborate and communicate in 
a disaster is critical to effective 
emergency response and needs 
to be improved. . . . . 
Relationships . . . must be built 
in advance of an emergency so 
that this collaboration and 
communication can occur when 
needed.” 
 
—United Way of King County, A 
Region at Risk: Improving Our 




In such a complex field, with so many actors and such high stakes, philanthropies across the 
nation are still searching for a strategic response to the challenges posed by disasters.  To date, 
most foundations have funded disaster-related activity on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis and 
have not identified it as a program area or developed specific guidelines for grantmaking in this 
field. 
 
While there is a growing body of literature regarding philanthropy’s response to specific 
incidents such as Hurricane Katrina, there has been little analysis across disasters to identify 
trends.  In the course of this study, data from the Foundation Center and Georgetown University 
were used to compare philanthropy’s response to September 11th with the giving that followed 
Hurricane Katrina.  A number of findings emerged: 
 
 
1. The contributions of foundations and corporations, while generous, were eclipsed 
































Giving by individuals often far exceeds 
institutional giving immediately after a 
disaster, but these surges in giving and 
volunteerism do not always translate into 
effective action in the field. 
While individual charitable giving generally exceeds institutional giving, this phenomenon 
was especially evident 22 months following Hurricane Katrina, when individual giving 
(sometimes called “horizontal philanthropy”) generated $5 billion in aid, compared to 
$910 million for all philanthropic institutions.  Even that staggering number understates 
the true value of horizontal philanthropy’s response, since it does not include the value 
of the labor of individuals, community organizations and faith-based groups who 
volunteered countless hours to help the victims. 
 
2. While this outpouring of individual philanthropy is profoundly inspiring, it 
presents challenges as well as opportunities.  Most of this type of giving occurs 
immediately after a disaster when the images of devastation are fresh in the public 
consciousness.  The difficulties of managing these sudden surges of individual gifts and 
volunteers were described in vivid terms by members of the Task Force recounting their 
own experiences.  In one example, a local official issued a call for volunteers to place 
sandbags on the banks of a flood-swollen river, only to have 20 times the number of 
volunteers she needed, while other areas along the river remained desperately short of 
help.  Another Task Force member recalled how donors swamped her community with 
donations of clothing for flood victims (including nine wedding dresses) when the most 
essential supplies (drinking water and food) remained in extremely short supply. 
 
3. The contributions of foundations and corporations to victims of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina continued over a longer period of time than the surge of 
contributions by individuals.  These philanthropies also made donations to a wider 
range of needs, such as community redevelopment and arts organizations, rather than 
focusing solely on the immediate needs of the victims. 
 
4. The events of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina marked a watershed for the 
philanthropic sector.  While most foundations and corporations are still coming to 
terms with the potential changes that will be required for the sector to play a more pivotal 
role in responding to future disasters, our research identified many examples of 
philanthropies that have initiated significant changes in their policies and practices to 




Loading water salvaged from Wal-Mart 







The recommendations that follow reflect an underlying vision and set of principles about how 




Vision and Principles 
 
 Families, individuals, businesses, schools, and institutions will be well-informed and prepared to care for themselves 
and their neighbors in a disaster. 
 
 Public agencies will have well-designed plans and adequate resources to respond, and mutual aid arrangements with 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 Nonprofit agencies, civic groups and faith communities will have well-established relationships of trust with public 
agencies, and clearly delineated roles for each to play during recovery. 
 
 Philanthropies will have plans in place to channel resources to meet extraordinary needs in a timely way. 
 
 All these partners will have a medium to communicate with one another to coordinate their actions and capture and 
deploy the surge in resources in times of crisis to meet needs in a timely way. 
 
 The Partners will conduct a systematic review of each event to improve performance, and to identify causes that can 







To achieve the vision will require the cooperation and hard work of all sectors.  To identify 
philanthropy’s most promising opportunities to play a role in achieving the vision, the Task Force 
drew on findings in the report, including promising practices in Table 7A, and focused on two 
types of activities: 
 
 Strategic actions that lie at the intersection of major 
needs in disaster management and the 
competencies, strengths and orientations of the 
philanthropic sector; and 
 
 Catalytic actions that will help to trigger additional 
gains through the actions of other parties. 
 
Those opportunities appear to fall into four major areas that closely parallel the central interests 
of many Washington philanthropies: The need for community-wide action; the desire to make 
the most of our assets; the importance of creating a culture of inclusion; and the importance of 
stewarding our natural and built environments. 
 
 
1. A call for community-wide action 
 
The Task Force found that the spirit of collaboration and the open communication 
fostered by this project have enormous potential to aid in building our communities’ 
resilience when faced with disaster.  To build upon that foundation, philanthropies can 
take actions both within the sector and across sectors to build a stronger community-
wide response to disasters. 
 
Within the philanthropic sector, individual philanthropic organizations can lead by 
example by: 
 
A. Helping grantees develop plans to continue their operations in a disaster. 
 
B. Preparing their own internal disaster plans. 
 
C. Identifying fund sources that could be freed up to meet community needs in a 
time of crisis. 
 
D. Streamlining grantmaking processes to put those funds to work quickly. 
 
Community  dinner 
Source: ww.stockxchng.com 
 E. Establishing partnerships with other foundations so the sector as a whole can be 
more effective in responding to disasters. 
 
Beyond the sector, philanthropy could also play a lead role in connecting the disparate 
sectors of our community including government, nonprofit organizations, citizens, the 
business community, and others, to build the trust needed for successful disaster 
management.  The following activities could be considered: 
“In Pierce County we have an 
annual summit of all the 
organizations that work to help 
people. We are training their 
staff and some clients in how to 
prepare for disasters. Also many 
nonprofits and faith groups are 
involved in Citizen Corps. They 
provide volunteers who can be 
vetted and trained in advance to 
help in shelters, and to manage 
the spontaneous donations of 
goods and people who just 
show up to help.” 
 
Steve Bailey, President, Washington 
State Emergency Management 
Association, and Director, Pierce 
County Department of Emergency 
Management 
 
F. Create a framework to sustain the community dialogue that has been sparked by 
this project so that all sectors are better organized and prepared to respond to 
the challenge.  This could involve convening periodic gatherings to share 
information and conduct joint emergency planning, or bringing key players 
together after a disaster to share lessons learned, identify mitigation strategies 
and forge joint initiatives. 
 
G. Build relationships and lines of communications with emergency management 
officials in advance of a crisis.  These lines of communications are necessary to 
ensure that FEMA assistance regulations are not breached and to make 
philanthropic aid as effective as possible. 
 
H. Help launch a project to create a Web-based tool to foster communication across 
sectors and in real time.  The tool could also be designed to facilitate timely and 
effective individual giving and volunteer service by providing up-to-the-minute 
information via the Internet about where help is needed.  It might also be 
designed to provide a mechanism for citizens to make direct contributions to 
specific disaster survivors based upon the model established by Web sites such 
as http://www.KIVA.org. 
 
I. Build partnerships to create specialized resources (such as surge capacity in the 
regional hospital system) which no one institution or local jurisdiction alone can 
provide. 
 
J. Provide the catalyst to create mechanisms for urban communities to share 
specialized resources with rural underserved communities. 
 
K. Convene a community effort to focus on the pivotal importance of schools in 
disaster preparedness, response and recovery. 
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The evidence shows that the level of contributions and volunteerism surge dramatically 
in the wake of a disaster.  Indeed, the Task Force found that individual giving is the most 
powerful source of financial help as well as volunteer labor in a crisis, outpacing the 
contributions of foundations and corporations combined.  However the Task Force also 
discovered that the surge in giving and volunteer energy that occurs immediately after a 
disaster does not always translate into effective and well-coordinated action in the field.  
Nor does that surge of civic energy last long enough to drive improvements during 
stages other than the immediate response to the crisis.   
C. Provide training, equipment, and resources to enable existing Citizen Corps 
organizations to develop Care Teams to provide case management services for 
vulnerable persons and help families and individuals throughout the recovery 
process.  A detailed description of Care Teams in Pierce County is shown in 
Appendix E. 
There is a tremendous 
opportunity for organized 
philanthropy to provide the tools 
to make citizen energy and 
generosity more effective in 
times of crisis. 
2. Making the most of our assets 
 
 
There would seem to be a tremendous opportunity for organized philanthropy to provide 
the tools to make this citizen energy and generosity more effective.  These actions would 
include activities that help communities channel individual giving and volunteer energy to 
where they are most needed during an emergency, and to fill large gaps that exist in the 
areas of preparedness and recovery.  Specific activities that deserve consideration 
include those that: 
 
A. Provide local communities with the resources to organize Citizen Corps groups to 
make volunteers more effective.  The successful model currently in place in 
Pierce County and some other jurisdictions provides the blueprint for others.  The 
Corps members would receive training in advance, and could be deployed in a 
variety of capacities during an emergency, such as sand bagging, traffic control, 
and debris removal.  The Citizen Corps framework also provides a way to take 
advantage of the specialized skills of volunteers in fields such as medicine and 
nursing (Medical Reserve Corps), engineering or construction.  Citizen Corps 
also provide the basic structure from which to create “Care Teams” (see point C. 
below). 
 
B. Provide communities that experience frequent disasters with the resources to 
establish volunteer reception centers to organize volunteers on-site and deploy 
them where needs are greatest.  
 
 D. Provide the catalyst to link Citizen Corps organizations with volunteer groups to 
special skills, such as the American Institute of Architects and the Structural 
Engineers of Washington so that damage assessment and repairs can be 
completed more rapidly. 
 
E. Provide communities with the communication tools and technology to channel 
financial contributions to the areas of greatest need throughout all stages of a 
disaster. 
 
F. Provide resource-poor and rural communities with specific capital equipment that 
is needed for disaster response (generators, public-safety radios, etc.). 
 
 
3. Creating a culture of inclusion 
 
The needs of all members of our communities must be met in times of crisis.  The Task 
Force found evidence that vulnerable populations—including the poor, those who are 
elderly or disabled, and those with limited English—are disproportionately affected 
through all stages of a disaster.  They are least prepared beforehand, most unable to 
respond in the immediate aftermath, and face the greatest barriers to long-term 
recovery.  Emergency management agencies recognize the need for and are working 
toward more effective disaster management for vulnerable communities, but significant 
gaps remain.  Because many Washington philanthropies have a long history of working 
on issues affecting vulnerable populations, the sector is uniquely positioned to help bring 
greater social equity to the way our communities take action before and after disasters. 
Alverna Palmer puts gasoline in the generator. The 
Carnation family finally saw the light Sunday night, 
when crews restored heat and light to the 
beleaguered community. (December 25, 2006) 
 
Credit: Meryl Schenker/Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
 
Community nonprofit organizations—many of which are philanthropy’s current 
grantees—provide an indispensable link to vulnerable populations, especially through 
informal networks that often play essential roles in vulnerable communities.  At present 
these organizations lack adequate financial and human resources and technical 







“Advocacy groups are an 
important component in the 
special needs communities. 
These groups can bring 
specialized information, 
subject-matter experts, and 
additional resources to the 
table. These organizations 
frequently find themselves 
being the lifeline to people 
with special needs during 
and after a crisis.” 
 
—Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Populations with 
Special Needs, 2006 
A. Advocate for the direct involvement of representatives of vulnerable communities 
to be directly involved with public agencies in developing the policies and 
procedures for disaster management. 
 
B. Build the capacity of community-based organizations, including informal 
organizations that are often important communication links to vulnerable 
populations, to play their essential roles in disaster management and to advocate 
for their constituents in times of crisis. 
 
C. Provide resources for projects to improve communications with non-English 
speaking populations and those who are deaf or deaf/blind during all phases of 
disaster preparedness and response. 
 
D. Provide the resources to train volunteer chore service workers, home health care 
personnel and other care givers to aid their clients in a crisis. 
 
E. Identify and test additional strategies to meet the needs of isolated seniors and 
other vulnerable individuals who do not have formal case management services 
but may need help during a disaster. 
 
F. Remind the news media about the critical importance of providing coverage of 
disaster events that occur in rural areas or disadvantaged communities. 
 
 
4. Stewarding the natural and built environments 
 
Many of the disasters that have afflicted Washington’s communities in recent years were 
caused, in whole or in part, by alterations in the natural and built environments.  Our 
community has the ability to repair that damage and prevent or mitigate future disasters  
through thoughtful policies and day-to-day actions.  To address that challenge, the Task 
Force suggests that philanthropy: 
 
A. Convene community leaders and public officials after disasters to thoroughly 
evaluate the causes, review after-action reports and develop and implement 
action plans to mitigate the causes. 
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B. Help to educate the community and policymakers about the relationship between 
the stewardship of the natural and built environments—and disaster prevention 
and mitigation. 
 
C. Advocate for and help to fund projects that restore natural systems and 
infrastructure and their capacities to prevent disasters such as flooding and 
wildfires when there is sound scientific evidence that restoration could prevent or 
mitigate future damage and other calamities. 
 
D. Provide resources to test innovative strategies to address specific environmental 
hazards. 
 
By acting on these opportunities, philanthropy could help to create a community-wide response 
to the challenges posed by disasters that, in the very act of its creation, will help to accomplish 













The severity of flooding in Lewis County and Southwest Washington in December, 2007 led to 
an emerging realization among numerous philanthropic organizations in Washington state that 
the 2007 flood was not a 100-year event—but is emblematic of potential, recurring weather-
related disasters.  Not only did the 2007 flooding signify, on the heels of a major weather event 
in 2006, that major weather events are likely to repeat with more frequency—it dramatized that 
these events are likely to affect all areas of the economy that impact peoples’ lives and 
livelihoods.  Moreover, the 2007 winter storm flooding in Western Washington revealed that 
many philanthropic organizations in Washington state didn’t have a point of view about how 
philanthropy can leverage its strengths to play a meaningful role in disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery.  These events, coming in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
and other disasters at both the local and national level, stirred discussion within Washington’s 
philanthropic sector about how philanthropy could help build the capacity of our communities to 
meet the challenges posed by such disasters.  As a result of those discussions, the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle Foundation, and United Way of King County commissioned 
this examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Washington’s current disaster response 
capability, and the lessons learned by philanthropy when confronted with disasters in other 
areas of the country. 
 
Few Washington philanthropies have disaster preparedness and relief as an explicit focus of 
their giving, but many are finding that requests for their involvement in this field are coming 
more often and with greater urgency.  There are a number of reasons for this trend: 
 
• September 11th and Hurricane Katrina were watershed events in which philanthropy 
played larger roles than in past events, leading to increased expectations of the sector. 
 
• Scientists report that climate change and other alterations in the natural environment are 
causing natural disasters to occur more frequently. 
 
• After 9/11 there was a shift in the government’s focus toward funding activities 
associated with terrorism rather than general disaster preparedness, leaving major gaps 
in funding for public health and other essential services. 
 
• As the current economic recession has grown worse, the ability of government agencies 
to cope with disasters has been constrained by resource limitations. 
 
Credit: FOIA to the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, Seattle District. 
 As a consequence, foundations, corporations and United Way organizations are increasingly 
being asked to fill the gaps when local disaster management agencies are tapped out.  The net 
result is that whether a foundation’s primary interest is community development, enhancing the 
arts, alleviating poverty or almost any other charitable purpose, it will almost inevitably be 
confronted with the need to respond to some form of disaster, because the impact of these 
events is felt in every sector.  For philanthropies with  a focus on working with disadvantaged 
populations, this need is especially acute, because the evidence shows those groups are at 
greater risk, suffer more severe effects, and take longer to recover from a disaster than others. 
 
Many philanthropists have responded generously to recent disasters with one-time grants, 
intended to ameliorate the human suffering that inevitably follows a disaster.  There has been 
an understandable reluctance to delve more deeply into this field, because until recently, 
disasters were regarded as rare occurrences affecting local areas. In addition, disasters have 
been regarded as the province of government and nonprofit relief agencies (such as the Red 
Cross) with specific expertise in emergency response.  Yet the tragic events of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina, and the increasing frequency of flooding, windstorms and other events here 
in Washington, have caused many to believe that more must be done to see that our 
communities are prepared to endure and recover from disasters. 
 
In late summer 2008, the project sponsors selected the Cedar River Group and Trang D. Tu 
Consulting to conduct research and provide staff support to a Task Force comprised of public 
and tribal officials, leaders of nonprofit organizations and communities of faith, and 
representatives of other philanthropies with experience in disaster response.  The Task Force 
members and their affiliations are listed in the acknowledgements. 
 
During the past several months, the Task Force members have given generously of their time 
and expertise to guide the research that formed the basis of this report.  The research was 
drawn from three sources: 
 
Wild\fire on sky 
Source: www.stockxchng.com 
“A regional approach must be 
taken when addressing large or 
catastrophic disasters.”  
 
—Emergency Management Council, 
Statewide Emergency Preparedness, 
2007-08 Annual Report to the 
Governor, 2008 
• A literature review, including reports from the Washington State Emergency 
Management Council, the Emergency Management Division and many other sources 
regarding the State’s current capabilities and philanthropy’s response to past disasters 
throughout the nation (see Appendix E); 
 
• Interviews with Task Force members and other experts (see Appendix A); and 
 
• Presentations and discussion at the Task Force’s meetings. 
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The Task Force also invited other experts from the public, private, philanthropic and media 
sectors to participate in two full-day workshops that focused on the strengths and vulnerabilities 
of Washington’s current system, and on best practices that have emerged from the experience 
of philanthropies throughout the country.  (The workshop agendas, panelists and summaries are 
included in a separate document, “Record of Proceedings.”)  At its final meeting on March 27th 
2009 the Task Force reviewed the findings and refined the recommendations that appear in this 
report. 
 
In the course of their work, many of the Task Force members commented that the dialogue that 
occurred during their meetings – across sectors and transcending differences of organizational 
culture and terminology – had broadened their perspective and sparked new possibilities for 




 A northbound kayak on I-5 




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The Four Phases of Disaster Management 
 
To place the research in context, it is useful to evaluate our communities’ capacity for resilience 
in each of four phases of disaster management, as illustrated and described below. 
 
  Figure 1. Four Phases of Disaster Management 
 
• Mitigation – The mitigation phase occurs between events, when communities and 
individuals have an opportunity to take actions that reduce or eliminate the long-term 
risks from natural and technological hazards.  These can be risks to the people, 
property, the environment and/or the economy.  Examples of mitigation are building 
code requirements, disaster insurance, hazard information systems, public education, 
risk mapping, safety codes and tax incentives. 
 
• Preparation – In addition to mitigating hazards, communities and individuals must 
prepare for those threats that cannot be eliminated through mitigation.  Examples are 
alert systems, emergency communications, emergency operations centers, emergency 
plans, mutual aid agreements, and training exercises. 
Hurricane Katrina aftermath, New Orleans, 30 
August-5 September 
 
Photo: Michael Appleton, USA, New York 
Daily News
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• Response – The response phase includes actions agencies and individuals take 
immediately before, during or after an emergency occurs.  These are actions that will 
save lives, minimize damage to property and the environment, and make recovery more 
effective.  Examples are activating emergency plans and warning systems, instructions 
to the public, emergency medical assistance, shelter and evacuation, and search and 
rescue. 
 
• Recovery – During the recovery phase actions are taken to return a community’s 
utilities, roads and other key systems to a basic operating level, and return life to normal 
or improved levels.  Examples are damage assessment, decontamination, crisis 
counseling, disaster application centers, disaster unemployment assistance, temporary 
housing and reconstruction.  Ideally, the recovery phase spurs more mitigation actions. 
 
The research suggests that Washington is generally stronger in the areas of Preparation and 
Response than in Mitigation and Recovery.  Each of these two groupings has at least one thing 
in common: who plays the primary role.  In the preparation and response phases, government 
plays the lead role.  Emergency management agencies spend much effort in preparing for 
disasters.  First responders and emergency management agencies take the lead in the initial 
response after a disaster.  Certainly, emergency agencies also play key roles in mitigation and 
recovery.  But for these two phases to be successful, the community must also play a big role.  
For example, community-based organizations need to train community leaders to help families 
and individuals mitigate the hazards in their homes and businesses by taking such actions as 
securing shelves to the walls so they don’t fall over in an earthquake.  For full recovery to take 
place, everyone in the affected community must be involved over the long term to help the 
victims recover and rebuild the community’s infrastructure. 
 
The Emergency Management System 
 
When a disaster occurs, emergency personnel begin a highly-structured process to assess the 
impact and determine the appropriate response.  The table below summarizes the steps that 
are taken by government agencies during the course of a disaster, and Figure 2 diagrams the 
sequence of actions that lead to a federal disaster declaration. 
“During the emergency and relief 
phases following a disaster, 
organizational presence, volunteers 
and resources may be abundant. 
Soon thereafter, volunteers and 
resources become scarce.” 
 
—National Voluntary Organizations Active 
in Disaster, Long-Term Recovery Manual 
 Source: www.stockscng.com 
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Table 1: Emergency Management and Process of Declaring a Disaster 
Government Agency and Functions Steps in Declaring a Disaster 
LOCAL LEVEL 
1. Local disaster response. When a disaster occurs, first responders are first on the scene. 
2. The local emergency management agency opens and staffs its Emergency Operations Center. The job of this 
center is to be the central point for communication and coordination of the response. 
3. If the first responders or the local emergency management agency need help, they can call upon the other 
jurisdictions who have agreed to help as needed (mutual aid agreements). 
4. In addition, there are local private organizations (such as the Red Cross), community groups and volunteers 
who help respond to emergencies. They take on such tasks as staffing emergency shelters, and canvassing 
neighborhoods to identify disaster survivors and aid them in getting help. 
Disaster management in Washington state begins 
at the local level. Each area has its own first 
responders, including police, fire fighters and 
paramedics. There are 39 county, and 29 city 
and tribal emergency management agencies. 
Local emergency management agencies identify 
hazards in their area and ways to respond to the 
emergencies that might arise. They create 
disaster management plans and coordinate 
training for emergency situations. 
5. Local emergency declaration. If the disaster is widespread, the county or city declares an emergency. The 
local emergency management office then notifies the state Emergency Management Division (EMD). 
STATE LEVEL 
6. State response. When a local emergency management agency asks EMD for help, the EMD activates the state 
Emergency Operations Center to coordinate the response across jurisdictions, and makes statewide resources 
available. 
7. If the emergency affects a large area, the state asks local and federal officials to conduct a joint, preliminary 
assessment of the damage. They review how much damage the disaster has caused and what impact it has had 
on residents and public facilities. 
The state Emergency Management Division 
(EMD) is part of the Washington State Military 
Department. The EMD identifies hazards in the 
state and ways to respond, and develops a 
comprehensive disaster management plan. The 
EMD also reviews local emergency plans, 
coordinates mutual aid, provides 24/7 alert and 
warning services, maintains the state Emergency 
Operations Center, provides training and 
exercises, provides public education, and serves 
as the link for federal-level assistance. 
8. State emergency declaration. In a widespread or major disaster, the governor proclaims a state emergency. 
With this declaration, the governor can ask the federal government for help, through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
9. Federal response. When a state governor declares an emergency, FEMA evaluates the damage and 
requirements, and reports them to the Secretary of DHS. 
10. The Secretary of the DHS reviews the request. If it meets the criteria for a federal emergency, the Secretary 
makes a recommendation to the President of the United States. 
11. Federal emergency/disaster declaration. The President makes either a federal emergency declaration or a 
federal disaster declaration. These declarations make federal resources available to the affected state. A 
disaster declaration also means that disaster survivors can apply for grants from FEMA. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) is part of the federal Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). FEMA works to reduce 
the loss of life and property, and protect the nation 
from all hazards. It develops and provides models 
of hazard assessment plans and comprehensive 
disaster management plans, and provides training 
and education. FEMA also has assistance 
programs that can provide grants or loans to help 
cities and counties repair infrastructure damaged 
in the disaster, and to help households and 
businesses recover. 
12. Federal aid for recovery. FEMA grants for temporary housing, housing repairs and other expenses are limited 
to a maximum of $30,300 per household. But the average grant nationwide is less than $5,000. Homeowners 
and businesses can also apply to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for a loan to rebuild. 
  8
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Source: Washington Military Dept., Emergency Management Division, “State Assistance to Local Jurisdictions” presentation. 
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“Two major themes 
emerged from the After-
Action Report from the 
windstorm of 2006: (1) 
government needs to more 
fully engage the private 
sector in all phases of 
preparedness, response 
and recovery operations, 
and (2) safety warnings and 
emergency preparedness 
messages need to be 
communicated in a variety 
of languages to safeguard 
community members who 
are not fluent in English.” 
 
—Major General Timothy J. 
Lowenberg, Washington Military 
Department, “Team Washington 
Homeland Security Update,” 
The Limits of Government’s Response 
 
As the Task Force members examined the current process and recounted their own 
experiences, it became apparent that there are several important points about government’s 
response to disasters that most residents and businesses do not fully understand: 
 
• Individuals, families and businesses need to be able to survive by themselves for at least 
three days without power, heat, fresh water or outside sources of food.  The conditions 
during an emergency may make it difficult for emergency responders to reach everyone 
right away or may overwhelm the resources available.  There also may be no telephone 
and cell phone service. 
 
• FEMA grants are available only if the disaster rises to the level of a presidential disaster 
declaration (that is, has gone through the steps above). 
 
• FEMA grants are intended to help disaster survivors recover, but they are generally not 
sufficient to make survivors whole.  Unfortunately, many survivors think that the 
government will restore them to the conditions in which they were living before the 
disaster, and that is rarely the case. 
 
• It can take eight to 10 weeks before FEMA grant funding is available. 
 
• FEMA grant funding is limited to a maximum of $30,300 per family.  The average FEMA 
grant nationwide is less than $5,000. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Washington’s Disaster Response 
Capabilities 
 
With these basic facts in mind, the study team and Task Force members sought to identify the 
strengths and the gaps in our state’s existing disaster management system.  A detailed chart of 
strengths and weaknesses organized by the four phases of disaster management is provided in 
Appendix B.  Many of the strengths and weaknesses span two or more of the phases of disaster 
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management.  But several topics or themes emerged as being significant.  So the summary 
below is organized by theme. 
 
1. Organization and Staffing 
 
Strengths:  The organization and staffing of emergency management in Washington is 
generally sound.  The structure — starting at the local level, progressing to assistance 
from nearby jurisdictions, then the state, then the federal government — is a good one.  
Most cities, counties, Tribes, and the State have developed solid emergency 
management plans, and are carrying out efforts to mitigate hazards.  The first 
responders and emergency agency staff are professional, trained and skilled at what 
they do.  The local and state agencies and the Tribes generally have a strong capacity 
for emergency response.  
 
In addition, nonprofits such as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army are ready to 
fill important roles in response and have provided excellent service.  The emergency 
management agencies in many communities also help to coordinate groups of individual 
volunteers — Voluntary Health Care/Medical Reserve Corps (for health care providers) 
and Citizen Corps.  These individuals get training in advance to respond to disasters and 
can activate quickly when needed. 
 
Washington Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (WAVOAD) has taken a 
leadership role in helping communities organize long-term recovery.  WAVOAD itself is 
made up of nonprofits, faith-based organizations and government agencies.  The 
nonprofit and faith-based groups are capable and well-connected in their communities.  
They have strong experience in helping disaster survivors and communities identify their 
needs and in guiding them through the steps to get back on their feet.  The WAVOAD 
members are competent, compassionate and committed. 
 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  In spite of these strengths, there are shortcomings in 
organization and staffing.  A key factor is the level of funding for disaster management 
agencies and their nonprofit partners.  Expectations for what emergency management 
can do, especially for national security, have been increasing in recent years, while state 
and federal funding have been decreasing.  In some cases, agencies have received 
funding to launch a new program, but after the time-limited funding ends, they have 
trouble sustaining the effort.  Even at the national level, funding for disaster management 
Rail line with silage bales at 603 and Twin Oaks 
Photo: Jim Thode 
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is not a given.  Federal funding for disaster mitigation, for example, needs annual 
support in Congress. 
 
In addition, the level of resources for emergency management in Washington varies 
from county to county.  This means that the quality of emergency management services 
is inconsistent across the state.  The biggest funding challenges arise in disaster events 
that affect multiple counties, such as recent windstorms.  Another need is for adequate 
funding to enable health care personnel to take part in disaster training exercises to 
ensure that disaster response is rapid, effective and well-coordinated. 
 
Other needs related to organization and staffing are: 
 
• Performance standards for use at the local level. 
 
• Model plans that apply to rural communities. 
 
• Back-up communication systems so that responders can stay in touch with each 
other and the Emergency Operations Center. 
 
• Standard methods to assess the health and human services needs of disaster 
victims quickly. 
 
• Surge capacity to provide health care and human services during and after a 
disaster. 
 
• An adequate number of medical volunteers, especially in smaller and rural 
counties. 
 
• Sufficient staff resources in long-term recovery organizations to help victims 
throughout the full recovery process. 
 
• A system to identify potential mitigation strategies in the wake of each disaster. 
Two trees uprooted at this Renton apartment complex, 
among others. December 19, 2006. 
 
Source: Office of Washington State Climatologist Web 




Strengths:  The emergency management agencies and nonprofits have developed 
good sheltering capability in most areas of the state.  The American Institute of 
Architects and the Structural Engineers Association of Washington have organized their 
members to provide volunteer assistance to property owners to complete damage 
assessments of their homes and businesses.  This assistance often helps people to 
return to their homes and jobs more quickly. 
 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  There is a need for more shelters across the state for people 
who are “medically fragile,” such as those who need help with the activities of daily 
living, or who need oxygen or special medical equipment.  There is also a need for 
shelters that can address cultural needs, such as separate quarters for men and women, 
and religious and cultural requirements for diet.  Finally, there is a need for more shelters 
for pets, since many people are less likely to come to a shelter if they have to leave their 
pets and animals unattended at home. 
 
3. Relationships and Coordination 
 
Strengths:  Emergency management agencies and first responders coordinate well with 
each other across the boundaries of jurisdictions.  It is becoming common across the 
state for agencies and staff to come together in a regional approach to disasters.  For 
example, emergency management and public health agencies in Walla Walla, Benton, 
Franklin, Klickitat and Yakima counties work together as a region through mutual 
assistance agreements.  Most school districts have safety plans in place.  School 
administrators also are being trained in emergency management to give them a broader 
perspective.  Additionally, some government agencies and nonprofits appear to 
understand the need to communicate with each other before disasters happen. 
 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  Generally, emergency management agencies need to work 
on building relationships across all sectors in their communities, and businesses and 
nonprofits need to get involved in planning for disasters.  Specifically, the research for 
this project identified the following needs: 
 
Frustrated' immigrant family sticks together, 
wishes for normalcy 
 
Roberto Perez, 12, and his sister Mirsa, 10, try to 
stay warm as they play a game of Battleship to 
pass time. The family has had no electricity at 
their apartment since Thursday. 
 
Credit: Dan DeLong/Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
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• Stronger relationships and information-sharing agreements are needed among 
all agencies and businesses that provide critical infrastructure in each region 
(utilities, telecommunications, roads, transportation and fuels). 
 
• More widespread mutual aid is needed especially to assist rural areas. 
 
• Better coordination of emergency management across jurisdictions is essential, 
especially in the critical initial hours of a disaster. 
 
• Relationships and trust must be built between government agencies and 
nonprofits so that each knows whom to call and what to do when a disaster 
strikes. 
 
• Community-based organizations need the resources to help the people they 
serve prepare for and recover from disasters. 
 
• Relationships need to be built between philanthropy and emergency 
management agencies, and among philanthropic organizations around disaster 
management issues. 
 
• Better communication mechanisms are needed across all sectors. 
 
4. Vulnerable Populations 
 
Strengths:  The Task Force identified some areas of strength related to working with 
people who need extra assistance or a different approach in a disaster.  These 
“vulnerable populations” may have physical disabilities, or differences in language and/or 
culture that mean that a mass approach to disaster planning and response does not 
work well for them.  With these needs in mind, some local funding organizations like 
Public Health – Seattle King County, the City of Seattle and United Way of King County 
have been helping community leaders in nonprofit service organizations to train staff and 
volunteers prepare for disasters.  Similarly, some special purpose organizations such as  
Inside the fire station volunteers are preparing meals 
for community members. The vehicle shown here is 
called an Emergency Response Vehicle and it is 
used to provide food and supplies to communities 
who have been affected by disaster. 
 
Credit: Beverly Bean/American Red Cross 
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“[T]he strength of our community 
response is dependent on the 
ability of nonprofits to continue to 
endure and serve in a disaster. 
Generally, nonprofit human 
services agencies are not 
adequately  prepared to ensure 
continuity of services during a 
major disaster.”  
 
—United Way of King County, A Region 
at Risk: Improving Our Readiness to 
Respond to Disaster,” 2007 
Red Cross chapters are training community leaders and citizen volunteers within their regions in 
personal preparedness and service continuity planning.  In addition, cultural communities have 
many strengths that can help their members in the response and recovery phases.  Community 
leaders trained in disaster preparedness can help to make the most of those strengths. 
 
Emergency management agencies are starting to form connections with community-based 
organizations who work with vulnerable populations.  An example is Public Health – Seattle & 
King County, which has developed a Vulnerable Populations Team to assess needs, make 
connections, and identify the most useful media outlets and alternate pathways for 
communication.  Translated materials about disaster preparedness are now available in 
Spanish and other languages. 
 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  Generally, funding is not adequate to serve vulnerable populations in 
disasters.  Emergency management agencies have limited and inconsistent funding to identify 
and prepare for the needs of vulnerable populations, and community-based agencies don’t have 
the funding to help their communities prepare or recover.  This means that the government is 
not prepared to help people outside of a mass care framework.  Vulnerable populations are less 
likely to get the services they need immediately after a disaster.  This lack of services and 
resources means that disasters tend to worsen the effects of poverty, and to further isolate 
vulnerable groups and individuals. 
 
Specific needs of vulnerable populations for disaster management include the following: 
 
• Information for emergency management agencies on the special care needs of people 
living in their own homes. 
 
• Case management, both for individuals receiving ongoing support services, and for 
vulnerable individuals who aren’t receiving services through health and human services 
agencies but who require assistance in an emergency. 
 
• Greater attention to the need for emergency plans at group care facilities (such as 




• Partnerships between emergency management agencies and community-based 
organizations serving immigrant and refugee communities and other vulnerable 
populations, to start two-way communication about disaster preparedness. 
 
• Training and technical assistance for community-based organizations so they 
can help their communities with disaster preparation and response. 
 
• A Community Communications Network (such as in King County) to reach 
vulnerable residents with important messages in emergencies, and further work 
to identify communications channels to reach individuals with few connections to 
the community. 
 
• More translations of safety warnings on equipment for home use and of disaster 
preparedness information. 
 
• Resources to connect first responders to interpreters so they can better help 
limited English-speaking residents. 
 
5. Disaster Relief, Recovery and Mitigation 
 
Strengths:  Nonprofit relief organizations such as the Red Cross and the Salvation 
Army have performed very well during many recent crises.  Pierce County is leading the 
way in creating new models for tapping volunteers’ energy by creating a Citizen Corps 
and “care teams” to work one-on-one with families during the recovery phase.  Greater 
attention is being given to building the capacity of “long-term recovery organizations” in 
many areas of the state. 
 
The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) will issue a White Paper in 
the summer of 2009 to spur a dialogue regarding a national mitigation strategy which 
may provide an opportunity for philanthropy to educate the public and policymakers 




Repairing the damage after 2006 windstorm. 
Credit: Grant M. Haller/Seattle Post Intelligencer 
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“Community disaster education 
is where we can get the most 
bang for the buck. We use a 
‘teach the teacher’ model to 
train community leaders, who 
then train their own community 
members.”  
 
—Dr. Larry Petry, President and CEO, 
American Red Cross serving King and 
Kitsap Counties 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  In general, recovery and mitigation receive the lowest amount of 
resources and are the most challenging to address, since no one entity is clearly “in charge.” 
Yet everyone in the affected or potentially affected region has a stake in the success of these 
efforts.  
 
Some specific needs related to immediate disaster relief and to long-term recovery are: 
 
• Ways to manage “flash philanthropy” – large-scale, voluntary contributions of goods and 
money by individuals, businesses and philanthropic groups. 
 
• Tools to manage spontaneous volunteers. 
 
• Timely assistance for survivors during the eight- to 10-week gap before FEMA funding 
assistance is available. 
 
• More widespread use of grassroots “care teams,” such as Pierce County uses, to find 
disaster survivors, help identify their needs, and assist them through the process of 
applying for assistance and getting on their feet. 
 
• Ongoing and long-term help for the recovery of families and businesses/organizations, 
especially those who have been wiped out by the disaster. 
 
• Funding and a coordinated effort to retrofit homes and commercial buildings, such as 
mitigation for earthquakes.  
 
• Broad community-wide involvement in mitigation efforts. 
 
• Pathways for turning mitigation strategies into building codes and standards, and for 




2001 Nisqually earthquake 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org 
 6. Public Communication and Education 
 
Strengths:  There are many public communication and education services in place in 
Washington communities to help residents prepare for and effectively respond to 
disaster events.  Examples of a few of these services, include: 
 
• The Regional Public Information Network (RPIN) in the Puget Sound region, a 
one-stop resource to which more than 75 government, transportation, utility, 
health, and emergency response agencies contribute. 
 
• The “3 Days, 3 Ways” public education campaign in King County, and other such 
programs, focused on helping local residents anticipate and prepare for disasters 
and emergencies. 
 
• Citizens Corps, a grassroots strategy sponsored by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), to bring together government and community 
leaders to involve citizens in all-hazards emergency preparedness and response 
projects. 
 
• American Red Cross personal and workplace disaster preparedness trainings 
offered at no or low cost in many local Washington communities. 
Source: www.stockscng.com 
 
Additionally, many schools have disaster plans in place.  Some schools do an excellent 
job of teaching their students about how to prepare for disasters.  As mentioned above, 
some organizations such as Public Health –  Seattle & King County are developing new 
tools to communicate with vulnerable populations.  This study and other projects have 
helped to spur greater communication across sectors. 
 
Weaknesses and Gaps:  Many of the services identified above, tend to be used by 
residents who have the knowledge, time, and means (e.g., English language fluency, 
and mobility) to access and use these services.  The extent to which these services are 
familiar to and/or are used by vulnerable populations seems to be modest given the 
disproportionate effects of disasters overall among the poor and other vulnerable 
populations. 
 
“If the schools are closed, it 
doesn’t matter if the roads 
are clear.  If schools are 
open, parents have a window 
of time to start dealing with 
the family’s needs.” 
 
—Jim Mullen, Director, 




Furthermore, there are two key misunderstandings that most members of the public and many 
businesses have about disasters.  One is that they don’t need to prepare because government 
agencies or other services will be there to help them.  The other is that they will receive 
sufficient government funds to return to normal after a disaster.  Because of these 
misunderstandings, many residents and businesses are not prepared to survive on their own for 
several days, and after a disaster, they expect to get a government grant for the full amount of 
their losses.  Clearly there is a need for more and better public education about the limits of 
government’s ability to help in a disaster.  Another challenge is that the public – and even some 
officials – do not have an appreciation for the pivotal roles played by schools in disaster 
recovery.  As one Task Force member stated, “If the schools are closed, it doesn’t matter if the 
roads are clear.  If schools are open, parents have a window of time to start dealing with the 
family’s needs.”  Another pointed out that “in some communities, 80 percent of the children rely 
on school nutrition programs for most of their diet.  If the schools are closed, and their family 
wasn’t prepared, they’ll go hungry.”  Other specific communication and education needs include: 
 
• Effective ways to measure the results of public education and community outreach 
efforts. 
 
• Ways to use schools and existing organizations to deliver disaster preparedness 
information. 
 
• Robust communication and emergency notification systems in schools. 
 
• Use of alternative communication channels for the deaf, blind, for those with limited or 
no English language skills, and for the homeless and others who do not have access to 
newspapers, radio or television. 
 
• Communication methods using new technologies (such as cell phones, Twitter and 
social networking Web sites). 
 
• Ways to encourage businesses to do their own risk analysis and mitigation of their 
buildings and operations. 
Sinkhole causes flooding in West Seattle 
Jackson's backyard a few hundred feet away. 
(December 15, 2006) 
 




• Better ways to encourage residents and businesses to develop their own emergency 
plans and stock supplies, and for businesses to train their staff. 
 
• Ways to share information about good practices for mitigation of buildings, property and 
households. 
 
• Methods to encourage the media to give attention to disasters that occur in rural or 
disadvantaged communities. 
 
Clearly much has been accomplished in recent years through the hard work of many agencies 
and individuals.  Yet the research also reveals the great distance still to be traveled to help all of 
Washington’s communities become truly resilient in the event of disaster. 
 
Philanthropy’s Response to Disasters 
 
The second major topic of the team’s research was the identification of trends and promising 
practices in philanthropy’s response to disasters across the nation.  The research focused upon 
four key questions. 
 
1. What trends or patterns are evident in past grant making for disaster management? 
 
2. What criteria have guided philanthropies’ decision making? 
 
3. What have been the major challenges and lessons learned? 
 









In our national scan of the literature on these questions, we did not find any comprehensive 
analyses of grant making across multiple disasters that included both quantitative and 
qualitative data.  However, the Foundation Center and Georgetown University have completed 
two significant studies.  The Foundation Center collected nearly comprehensive quantitative 
data on charitable giving after the September 11th terrorist attacks and after Hurricane Katrina.1 
Georgetown University’s study included domestic and international disasters over the past 10 
years and focused on identifying qualitative trends in disaster grant making.2 The highlights 
from the studies are as follows: 
 
• The magnitude of giving varies by disaster.  The chart below shows that 36 months 
after 9/11, total private giving amounted to $2.8 billion.  Giving after Hurricane Katrina 
was much greater, with more than $6.5 billion contributed only 22 months after the 
storm. 
 
• Contributions from individual donors exceed the contributions of foundations and 
corporations combined.  The chart also reveals the extent to which individual 
philanthropy (sometimes called horizontal philanthropy) played a central role in both 
disasters and the dominant role after Hurricane Katrina.  Individual donors to the Gulf 
Coast storm victims accounted for $5.6 billion, while foundations and corporations 
together contributed $910 million. 
 
• Giving can vary by type of donor.  The second chart on the following page breaks 
down institutional giving for both disasters.3 In the case of 9/11, the $1.1 billion given by 
institutional donors included $722 million from corporations and $360 million from 
foundations.4 Two years after Hurricane Katrina, institutional giving included $519 million 
from corporations and $387 million from foundations.5 
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Note: “Foundation giving” includes that from independent, community and public foundations. “Corporate giving” includes that 
from corporations and corporate foundations. These figures do not include in-kind gifts or other non-monetary forms of support. 
Figure 3: Private Giving for September 11 and Hurricane Katrina Relief 
Source: Renz, “Final Update,” pp. 86, 88; Lorenz, p. 6. 
 
Figure 4: Institutional Giving for September 11 and Hurricane Katrina Relief 
 
guA ust 2005September 2001 
 September 2001 August 2005
Source: Renz, “Final Update,” pp. 86, 88; Lawrence, p. 6. 
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• Different types of donors give at different stages.  The bulk of individual giving takes 
place immediately after a disaster, while institutional giving occurs over a longer time 
horizon.  The first chart above suggests this in the relatively larger share of individual 
giving 22 months after Hurricane Katrina compared with 36 months after 9/11.6 
 
• 9/11 foreshadowed a shift in disaster grantmaking.  The Foundation Center’s 
analysis also indicated that 9/11 was a “watershed” disaster that broadened the scope of 
philanthropies’ giving and role well beyond the more narrow boundaries within which the 
sector had responded to past disasters.7 Hurricane Katrina, with its especially long 
timeframe for recovery, expanded that scope even further. 
 
 
Types of Recipient Organizations 
 
• Relief funds and national disaster relief organizations are major recipients of 
disaster philanthropy.  The table on the following page shows a significant percentage 
of funding after 9/11 went to “corporate and other relief funds.” In fact, more than 280 
relief funds were established after that disaster.8 After Hurricane Katrina, the American 
Red Cross received a preponderance of institutional grant dollars.9 
Children waiting at the Superdome, New Orleans, 




• Corporate and foundation donors differ in the types of organizations funded.  
Corporate givers were more likely to donate to relief funds and national relief 
organizations.  After 9/11, 81 percent of the sector’s funding went to corporate and relief 
funds versus 54 percent among foundations.  Similarly, after Hurricane Katrina, 31 
percent of corporate funding versus only 10 percent of foundation funding went to the 
American Red Cross.  Conversely, foundations were more likely to fund direct service 
organizations, which after 9/11 amounted to 44 percent of sector funding compared with 






Table 2: Corporate and Foundation Giving by Recipient Type 
 
 Sept. 11 
  Corporate Giving Foundation Giving 
  share of sector funding share of sector funding 
Corporate and other relief funds 81% 54%
Direct service organizations  9% 44%
Undesignated or unspecified 10% 3%
Gulf Coast Hurricanes 
  Corporate Giving Foundation Giving 
  share of sector funding share of sector funding 
American Red Cross 31% 10%
Undesignated 33% 4%
Other named recipients 23% 64%
Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund 3% 5%
Salvation Army 3% 6%
 
Note: Shading highlights major differences between Corporate and Foundation giving 
Source: Renz, “Final Update,” pp. 95, 96; Lawrence, p. 29. 
 
 
Purpose of Giving 
 
• Human services is a top-funded category; beyond that, areas of giving can vary by 
disaster.  The table on the following page reflects this for both 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina.  For the former, the top two categories for giving (not including giving to relief 
funds) were Arts and Culture and Human Services, while for the latter, Human Services 





Table 3: Giving by Subject Area, September 11 and Gulf Hurricanes 
  Sept. 11 Gulf Coast Hurricanes 
  $ (millions) % share $ (millions) % share 
Arts and Culture $55.6*  25.0% $15.2 1.7%
Human Services $54.6  24.5% $365.9 40.4%
Public/Society Benefit $43.6  19.6%     
Education $28.9  13.0% $92.9 10.3%
Health $23.2  10.4% $38.9 4.3%
International Affairs $9.1  4.1%     
Environment and Animals $3.0  1.4% $6.4 0.7%
Science and Social 
Science $2.7  1.2%     
Religion $1.7  0.8% $9.4 1.0%
Housing and Shelter     $56.6 6.2%
Economic and Community 
Development     $27.6 3.0%
Civil Rights and Public 
Affairs     $15.9 1.8%
Other     $72.7 8.0%
Undesignated     $204.60 22.6%
TOTAL $222.4**  100.0% $906.1 100.0%
• Corporate donors targeted a narrower range of areas while foundations covered a 
broader range.  The table below shows corporate giving after Hurricane Katrina spread 
among five major categories; in contrast, foundation giving spanned double the number 
of funding categories.12 
 
Note: Shading shows top categories. 
*In Sept. 11 giving, the high ranking of “Arts and Culture” reflects giving to “performing and visual arts groups and museums in the 
New York metropolitan area that suffered displacement or substantial loss of income following the attacks. Cultural recipients also 
included public broadcasting and other media organizations.” (Renz, “Final Update,” p. 97). 
**Does not include giving to disaster relief funds, so figure is less than the $1.1 billion in institutional giving shown in figures 3 and 
4.  




• Corporate donors focused more on basic and/or immediate needs while 
foundations were more likely to also support long-term recovery.  Among corporate 
dollars, the top percentage shares went to housing and human services or were 
undesignated, while foundations also gave significantly to education, economic and 
community development.13 
 
Table 4: Corporate and Foundation Giving by Subject Area 
 
Gulf Coast Hurricanes Comparison of Giving by Subject Area 
  Corporate Giving Foundation Giving 
  % share % share 
Human Services 43% 35%
Education 6% 20%
Undesignated and Other 42% 17%
Health 2% 7%
Environment and Animals   2%
Housing and Shelter 8% 3%
Economic and Community Development   7%
Civil Rights and Public Affairs   4%
International Affairs   1%
Arts and Culture   4%
TOTAL 101% 100%
  Universe: $519 m Universe: $296.5 m 
Note: Shading shows top categories for each giving source. 
Source: Lawrence, pp. 6, 9. 
 
 
Change in Giving Over Time 
 
The following chart shows post-Hurricane Katrina giving for each of the three years following the 
disaster.  Several observations emerge. 
 
• Overall giving declines with time.  Among institutional grants tracked by the 
Foundation Center, total giving fell from $472 million in 2005 to $8.5 million in 2008. 
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• The vast majority of initial giving is for emergency relief/response.  Immediately 
after the storm, $332.4 million of $472.4 million was for “safety/disasters” and nearly all 
of that was emergency relief funding. 
 
• Preparedness and mitigation are comparatively underfunded.  Very little of the 
$332.4 million was for preparedness or mitigation.  Other information sources confirm 
this as a pattern across geographies and disasters.14 
 
• Over time, the share of funding for response wanes and share of funding for long-
term recovery rises.  Funding for “safety/disasters” is gone by 2008.  A similar pattern 
exists for “health” funding.  In contrast, “community development” increases as a share 
of total funding and is the top funded category in 2007 and 2008.15 
 
Table 5: Change in Giving Subject Area, 2005–2008 
Gulf Coast Hurricanes Changes in Giving Over Time 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Safety/Disasters $332.40 $96.50 $5.80   
Education $33.90 $32.90 $18.20 $0.55 
Health $31.70 $15.80 $3.50 $1.40 
Housing and Shelter $23.70 $13.70 $9.20   
Human Services $9.70 $14.30 $5.10 $0.20 
Agriculture/Food $9.40 $3.90     
Community Development $9.40 $28.70 $18.90 $3.50 
Arts and Culture $9.20 $8.50 $2.60 $1 
Religion $7.90       
Science $5.10       
Civil/Human Rights   $3.10 $8.90 $1 
Environment      $2.40   $0.15 
Mental Health/Crisis Services     $3.90   
Public Affairs     $3.30   
Crime/Law Enforcement       $0.45 
Social Sciences       $0.30 
TOTAL $472.40 $219.80 $79.40 $8.55 
Note: Shading shows top categories per year.  Source: Foundation Center Online Database of Hurricane Katrina Giving, Jan. 2009. 
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Couple holding hands one year after the 
Katrina flooding in New Orleans. 
Source: www.TheWE.cc 
The Process of Giving 
 
Besides quantitative data on disaster grant making, our research also garnered qualitative 
information about trends in the process of disaster grant making. 
 
• Most philanthropies fund disaster management on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis 
and do not have existing program areas or guidelines.16 
 
• Disaster philanthropy is often treated as a “one-off” relief effort, so many 
institutions are not set up to take a longer term view of disasters.17 
 
• Because disasters are “recurrent,” some philanthropies find themselves engaged 
on a recurrent basis and seek to improve the effectiveness of their grant making. 
 
• The most prevalent funding criteria include: 
 
• Scale of the disaster, and whether it overwhelms government capacity;18 
 
• Whether the philanthropy has existing relationships with nonprofits in the affected area;19 
 
• Capacity of potential grantees to absorb an infusion of dollars; and 
 




Strengths, Challenges and Lessons of Philanthropic Engagement 
 
The following table highlights general strengths and weaknesses of past philanthropic 
engagement in disaster management. 
 
 
Table 6: Strengths and Weaknesses in Philanthropy’s Approaches to Disaster Giving 
Strengths20  Weaknesses 
 General mission to serve public good  Ad hoc decision making 
 Tend to have strong community relationships 
and knowledge 
 Ability to identify needs and potential grantees 
after disaster 
 Ability to convene   Rigid decision making structure can limit a 
timely, flexible response 
 Relatively apolitical decision making  Identifying “right” time to engage, and right time 
close out efforts 
 Programmatic flexibility can permit creative, 
strategic response 
 







Lessons and Considerations 
 
1. Funders can engage in important nongranting activities. 
 
• Craft internal plan of action and granting frameworks in advance.22 
 
• Convene essential sectors (nonprofits, government) to improve coordination and 
communication before and after disaster. 
 
• Compile and share information about needs. 
 
• Provide technical assistance in areas of strength (e.g., outcomes, evaluation, 
community outreach and nonprofits) 
 
2. How funding happens is as important as what is funded. 
 
• Identify potential grantees, build relationships in advance. 
 
• Use flexible approach to be responsive and timely.23 
 
• Form funding collaboratives.24 
 
• Put “boots on the ground” to better understand needs.25 
 
• Avoid “parachuting” in; rather, tap strengths of local community  
(philanthropic, nonprofit) and help build its capacity.26 
 
3. Take a long-term and/or more comprehensive view. 
 
• Give attention to disaster preparedness and mitigation.27 
 
• Identify strategic niche(s) in the timing of grant making. 
 
• Recognize systemic inequities in vulnerable communities. 
At the onset of the windstorm, a 
significant percentage of the 
high-risk populations had not 
been incorporated into any 
formal outreach or assistance 
plans.” 
 
—Washington State Military 
Department, December 2006 
Windstorm Response After-Action 






Building on the Lessons and Considerations in the previous section, the table below provides a summary of promising philanthropic 
practices in response to past disasters.  Examples are listed by disaster stage, and include a synopsis of each. 
 




Preparedness Philanthropic Ventures 
Foundation 
This foundation provides flexible granting in response to disasters by identifying and completing due diligence on 
nonprofit grantees before a disaster.  The foundation then develops Memoranda of Understanding with the nonprofits 
that allow reimbursement for expenses incurred by the nonprofit to resume/continue operations after a disaster.28  
Preparedness Redefining Readiness 
Project 
This project, undertaken by the New York Academy of Medicine with funding from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 
focuses on culturally-responsive and community-based disaster planning.  An initial study in 2004 surveyed over 2,500 
citizens across the United States. It found that a significant percentage of the public would not comply with instructions 
in a public emergency, due to lack of responsiveness to citizen concerns in emergency plans. 
 
From the study, the Academy has organized more than 200 focus groups with 2,000 citizens at four demonstration 
sites around the country.  The focus groups have brought citizens into the process and integrated their knowledge and 
needs into emergency plans. From this information, the Academy has developed toolkits to assist local jurisdictions in 
conducting similar community-based emergency planning.29  
Preparedness Medina Foundation The Medina Foundation has crafted the Nominator Network, a network of leaders and citizens from communities in 
which the foundation grants.  This group helps to identify and nominate grantee candidates after a disaster takes place.  
Their knowledge of affected areas helps ensure timeliness and effectiveness of grants.30
Preparedness Weyerhaeuser Foundation The Weyerhaeuser Foundation has done internal work to prepare for disaster grantmaking.  The foundation has 
created a matrix to determine how giving will happen after an event.  By doing so, Weyerhaeuser is improving its ability 
to respond more effectively after a disaster.31  
Preparedness United Way of King County Since 2007, United Way of King County has invested approximately $240,000 per year to enhance disaster 
preparedness and community resiliency in King County, Washington, by assisting nonprofit human service agencies 
that serve vulnerable populations.  This work – much of it done in collaboration with a leading edge Vulnerable 
Populations Action Team at Public Health – Seattle King County, and other nonprofit and public partners – provides 
nonprofit human service agencies with the tools for and information about the practice of emergency planning and 
resources to help develop, test, refine and implement agency emergency plans. 
 
  




Response Multiple grantmakers after 
Hurricane Katrina 
A number of foundations adapted, streamlined or otherwise altered standard grantmaking procedures to respond to 
the special circumstances and needs created by the hurricane.  These included the Ford Foundation, the Mary 
Reynolds Babcock Foundation and the Marguerite Casey Foundation allowing existing grantees to repurpose funds 
for emergency needs.  The 21st Century Foundation streamlined grant application procedures.  The Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation made limited term grants outside of existing programs, and the Greater New Orleans Foundation 
permanently expanded programs to support ongoing rebuilding work.32
Response New York Regional 
Association of 
Grantmakers (NYRAG) 
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, this regional association of grantmakers compiled a comprehensive resource guide 
to assist foundations in grantmaking in the region.  The guide included an inventory of nonprofits working with 
affected populations in the region, and an inventory of nonprofits funded by NYRAG member agencies.  NYRAG 
also organized forums and convenings to connect the philanthropic sector with each other and with local sources of 
information about needs. NYRAG’s leadership is a good example of the importance of compiling and sharing 
essential information about needs and mobilizing the sector.33  
Response Business Executives for 
National Security (BENS) 
Business Force 
The Business Force initiative is a network of businesses that form regional public/private partnerships to help close 
gaps in public sector disaster management.  The projects tap comparative strengths and expertise of the business 
sector in one or more of four areas: assets, volunteers, information sharing and strategic support.  Examples of 
activities include databases of business resource support, provision of volunteer manpower, business “emergency 
operations centers” to parallel that of government agencies, and assistance in supply chain management. This is a 
potential model that the philanthropic sector could replicate to tap its comparative strengths and organize itself in 
parallel with government agencies.34
Response Medina Foundation The Medina Foundation has provided grant support to communities affected by flooding disasters in Washington 
state in recent years.  In doing so, the foundation has focused on short-term response with an eye toward building 








Recovery Gulf Coast Fund for 
Community Renewal and 
Ecological Health 
This fund is an example of strongly collaborative grant making among not only funders, but between funders and 
local leaders.  The fund is structured to directly involve community leaders in the grant making process, thereby 
helping to ensure effective targeting of grants.  With a focus on systemic inequities and social justice concerns, the 
fund focuses on responding to short-term needs in a longer term context. 
Recovery Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center 
and Brookings Institution 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, these two organizations joined forces to publish the New Orleans Index.  This 
ongoing publication provides a source of credible data in accessible form on the progress of recovery. It has proved 
useful for policymakers, citizens and advocates alike.  The partnership combines the strengths of both 
organizations, with Brookings providing policy advocacy and communications expertise, and the Data Center 
translating data into accessible information for citizen and community use.  The project is also building the capacity 
of the Data Center as a local organization that can continue to provide this knowledge. 
Recovery Rockefeller Foundation Among the foundation’s contributions to Gulf Coast recovery has been support for the development of New 
Orleans’ rebuilding plan.  In addition to a $3 million grant for this effort, the foundation also put staff on the ground 
in New Orleans to manage the grant.  The staff became a strategic information resource, convener and essential 
implementer.  By being housed at the Greater New Orleans Foundation, the staff presence also helped build 





Mitigation The Seattle Foundation, 
United Way of King 
County, other local 
foundations 
The Building Resilience Fund is a collaborative grantmaking effort to strengthen community resilience. The Seattle 
Foundation, United Way of King County, and others are capitalizing a $6 million fund over three years.  The fund is 
intended to strengthen communities’ resiliency in recovering from disasters, including “slow-moving” disasters such 
as the current economic recession.37
Mitigation Oxfam America/PolicyLink Oxfam America, as a national intermediary, has deployed a multi-pronged strategy to support recovery in the Gulf 
Coast.  The program aims to achieve this by building capacity of local communities to advocate for equitable 
policies in affordable housing and worker rights.  Oxfam’s capacity building strategy has combined grants, 
organizing support, training and technical assistance, and strategic communications tools. 
 
Similar to Oxfam America’s work, PolicyLink has also focused on policy advocacy in the Gulf Coast.  One 
characteristic of PolicyLink’s approach has been to help build capacity for equitable recovery inside government 
agencies simultaneous with strengthening the ability of citizens to engage in the policy environment. 
Mitigation Ford Foundation After Hurricane Katrina, the Ford Foundation played an instrumental role in forming the Louisiana Disaster 
Recovery Foundation (LDRF).  Based in Baton Rouge, LDRF fills an important gap in local philanthropy by 







The recommendations that follow reflect an underlying vision and set of principles about how 




Vision and Principles 
 
 Families, individuals, businesses, schools, and institutions will be well-informed and prepared to care for themselves 
and their neighbors in a disaster. 
 
 Public agencies will have well-designed plans and adequate resources to respond, and mutual aid arrangements with 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 Nonprofit agencies, civic groups and faith communities will have well-established relationships of trust with public 
agencies, and clearly delineated roles for each to play during recovery. 
 
 Philanthropies will have plans in place to channel resources to meet extraordinary needs in a timely way. 
 
 All these partners will have a medium to communicate with one another to coordinate their actions and capture and 
deploy the surge in resources in times of crisis to meet needs in a timely way. 
 
 The Partners will conduct a systematic review of each event to improve performance, and to identify causes that can 









To achieve the vision will require the cooperation and hard work of all sectors.  To identify 
philanthropy’s most promising opportunities to play a role in achieving the vision, the Task Force 
drew on findings in the report, including promising practices in Table 7A, and focused on two 
types of activities: 
 
 Strategic actions that lie at the intersection of major 
needs in disaster management and the 
competencies, strengths and orientations of the 
philanthropic sector; and 
 
 Catalytic actions that will help to trigger additional 
gains through the actions of other parties. 
 
Those opportunities appear to fall into four major areas that closely parallel the central interests 
of many Washington philanthropies: The need for community-wide action; the desire to make 
the most of our assets; the importance of creating a culture of inclusion; and the importance of 
stewarding our natural and built environments. 
 
 
1. A call for community-wide action 
 
The Task Force found that the spirit of collaboration and the open communication 
fostered by this project have enormous potential to aid in building our communities’ 
resilience when faced with disaster.  To build upon that foundation, philanthropies can 
take actions both within the sector and across sectors to build a stronger community-
wide response to disasters. 
 
Within the philanthropic sector, individual philanthropic organizations can lead by 
example by: 
 
A. Helping grantees develop plans to continue their operations in a disaster. 
 
B. Preparing their own internal disaster plans. 
 
C. Identifying fund sources that could be freed up to meet community needs in a 
time of crisis. 
 
D. Streamlining grantmaking processes to put those funds to work quickly. 
Community  dinner 
Source: www.stockxchng.com 
 E. Establishing partnerships with other foundations so the sector as a whole can be 
more effective in responding to disasters. 
 
Beyond the sector, philanthropy could also play a lead role in connecting the disparate 
sectors of our community including government, nonprofit organizations, citizens, the 
business community, and others, to build the trust needed for successful disaster 
management.  The following activities could be considered: 
“In Pierce County we have an 
annual summit of all the 
organizations that work to help 
people. We are training their 
staff and some clients in how to 
prepare for disasters. Also many 
nonprofits and faith groups are 
involved in Citizen Corps. They 
provide volunteers who can be 
vetted and trained in advance to 
help in shelters, and to manage 
the spontaneous donations of 
goods and people who just 
show up to help.” 
 
Steve Bailey, President, Washington 
State Emergency Management 
Association, and Director, Pierce 
County Department of Emergency 
Management 
 
F. Create a framework to sustain the community dialogue that has been sparked by 
this project so that all sectors are better organized and prepared to respond to 
the challenge.  This could involve convening periodic gatherings to share 
information and conduct joint emergency planning, or bringing key players 
together after a disaster to share lessons learned, identify mitigation strategies 
and forge joint initiatives. 
 
G. Build relationships and lines of communications with emergency management 
officials in advance of a crisis.  These lines of communications are necessary to 
ensure that FEMA assistance regulations are not breached and to make 
philanthropic aid as effective as possible. 
 
H. Help launch a project to create a Web-based tool to foster communication across 
sectors and in real time.  The tool could also be designed to facilitate timely and 
effective individual giving and volunteer service by providing up-to-the-minute 
information via the Internet about where help is needed.  It might also be 
designed to provide a mechanism for citizens to make direct contributions to 
specific disaster survivors based upon the model established by Web sites such 
as http://www.KIVA.org. 
 
I. Build partnerships to create specialized resources (such as surge capacity in the 
regional hospital system) which no one institution or local jurisdiction alone can 
provide. 
 
J. Provide the catalyst to create mechanisms for urban communities to share 
specialized resources with rural underserved communities. 
 
K. Convene a community effort to focus on the pivotal importance of schools in 
disaster preparedness, response and recovery. 
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The evidence shows that the level of contributions and volunteerism surge dramatically 
in the wake of a disaster.  Indeed, the Task Force found that individual giving is the most 
powerful source of financial help as well as volunteer labor in a crisis, outpacing the 
contributions of foundations and corporations combined.  However the Task Force also 
discovered that the surge in giving and volunteer energy that occurs immediately after a 
disaster does not always translate into effective and well-coordinated action in the field.  
Nor does that surge of civic energy last long enough to drive improvements during 
stages other than the immediate response to the crisis.   
There is a tremendous 
opportunity for organized 
philanthropy to provide 
the tools to make citizen 
energy and generosity 
more effective in times of 
crisis. 
2. Making the most of our assets 
 
 
There would seem to be a tremendous opportunity for organized philanthropy to provide 
the tools to make this citizen energy and generosity more effective.  These actions would 
include activities that help communities channel individual giving and volunteer energy to 
where they are most needed during an emergency, and to fill large gaps that exist in the 
areas of preparedness and recovery.  Specific activities that deserve consideration 
include those that: 
 
A. Provide local communities with the resources to organize Citizen Corps groups to 
make volunteers more effective.  The successful model currently in place in 
Pierce County and some other jurisdictions provides the blueprint for others.  The 
Corps members would receive training in advance, and could be deployed in a 
variety of capacities during an emergency, such as sand bagging, traffic control, 
and debris removal.  The Citizen Corps framework also provides a way to take 
advantage of the specialized skills of volunteers in fields such as medicine and 
nursing (Medical Reserve Corps), engineering or construction.  Citizen Corps 
also provide the basic structure from which to create “Care Teams” (see point C. 
below). 
 
B. Provide communities that experience frequent disasters with the resources to 
establish volunteer reception centers to organize volunteers on-site and deploy 
them where needs are greatest.  
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C. Provide training, equipment, and resources to enable existing Citizen Corps 
organizations to develop Care Teams to provide case management services for 
vulnerable persons and help families and individuals throughout the recovery 
process.  A detailed description of Care Teams in Pierce County is shown in 
Appendix E. 
 
D. Provide the catalyst to link Citizen Corps organizations with volunteer groups to 
special skills, such as the American Institute of Architects and the Structural 
Engineers of Washington so that damage assessment and repairs can be 
completed more rapidly. 
 
E. Provide communities with the communication tools and technology to channel 
financial contributions to the areas of greatest need throughout all stages of a 
disaster. 
 
F. Provide resource-poor and rural communities with specific capital equipment that 
is needed for disaster response (generators, public-safety radios, etc.). 
 
 
3. Creating a culture of inclusion 
 
The needs of all members of our communities must be met in times of crisis.  The Task 
Force found evidence that vulnerable populations—including the poor, those who are 
elderly or disabled, and those with limited English—are disproportionately affected 
through all stages of a disaster.  They are least prepared beforehand, most unable to 
respond in the immediate aftermath, and face the greatest barriers to long-term 
recovery.  Emergency management agencies recognize the need for and are working 
toward more effective disaster management for vulnerable communities, but significant 
gaps remain.  Because many Washington philanthropies have a long history of working 
on issues affecting vulnerable populations, the sector is uniquely positioned to help bring 
greater social equity to the way our communities take action before and after disasters. 
 
Community nonprofit organizations—many of which are philanthropy’s current 
grantees—provide an indispensable link to vulnerable populations, especially through 
informal networks that often play essential roles in vulnerable communities.  At present 
these organizations lack adequate financial and human resources and technical 
knowledge to bridge the gaps effectively in emergencies.  Activities that should be 
considered include: 
Alverna Palmer puts gasoline in the generator. The 
Carnation family finally saw the light Sunday night, 
when crews restored heat and light to the 
beleaguered community. (December 25, 2006) 
 
Credit: Meryl Schenker/Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
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“Advocacy groups are an 
important component in the 
special needs communities. 
These groups can bring 
specialized information, 
subject-matter experts, and 
additional resources to the 
table. These organizations 
frequently find themselves 
being the lifeline to people 
with special needs during 
and after a crisis.” 
 
—Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Populations with 
Special Needs, 2006 
A. Advocate for the direct involvement of representatives of vulnerable communities 
to be directly involved with public agencies in developing the policies and 
procedures for disaster management. 
 
B. Build the capacity of community-based organizations, including informal 
organizations that are often important communication links to vulnerable 
populations, to play their essential roles in disaster management and to advocate 
for their constituents in times of crisis. 
 
C. Provide resources for projects to improve communications with non-English 
speaking populations and those who are deaf or deaf/blind during all phases of 
disaster preparedness and response. 
 
D. Provide the resources to train volunteer chore service workers, home health care 
personnel and other care givers to aid their clients in a crisis. 
 
E. Identify and test additional strategies to meet the needs of isolated seniors and 
other vulnerable individuals who do not have formal case management services 
but may need help during a disaster. 
 
F. Remind the news media about the critical importance of providing coverage of 
disaster events that occur in rural areas or disadvantaged communities. 
 
 
4. Stewarding the natural and built environments 
 
Many of the disasters that have afflicted Washington’s communities in recent years were 
caused, in whole or in part, by alterations in the natural and built environments.  Our 
community has the ability to repair that damage and prevent or mitigate future disasters 
through thoughtful policies and day-to-day actions.  To address that challenge, the Task 
Force suggests that philanthropy: 
 
A. Convene community leaders and public officials after disasters to thoroughly 
evaluate the causes, review after-action reports and develop and implement 
action plans to mitigate the causes. 
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B. Help to educate the community and policymakers about the relationship between 
the stewardship of the natural and built environments—and disaster prevention 
and mitigation. 
 
C. Advocate for and help to fund projects that restore natural systems and 
infrastructure and their capacities to prevent disasters such as flooding and 
wildfires—when there is sound scientific evidence that restoration could prevent 
or mitigate future damage and other calamities. 
 
D. Provide resources to test innovative strategies to address specific environmental 
hazards. 
 
By acting on these opportunities, philanthropy could help to create a community-wide response 
to the challenges posed by disasters that, in the very act of its creation, will help to accomplish 




The Task Force convened for its last meeting of this project on March 27, 2009. The group 
expressed a clear desire to continue the work begun through this project and provide 
opportunities for the agencies involved to move forward in collaboration.  The group decided on 
the following short-term action steps: 
 
 Each agency represented on the Task Force will convene discussions with their 
colleagues and constituencies, to share the findings of the report and define the 
contributions they can make to a cross-sector collaborative. 
 
 United Way of King County will organize and host a convocation of the organizations 
represented on the Task Force, and other stakeholders to continue the work initiated 
through the creation of this report. 
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